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Abstract—Pacemakers are common types of implants, in 
recent years there have been growing concerns around the 
security within these devices. This paper was created with the 
assistance of the NHS staff at NGH, it attempts to answer the 
question of if it is feasible to hack current models of NHS 
pacemakers. The experiments performed were done so in the 
mindset of an average hacker, not a team of experts with access 
to the required knowledge and equipment.  
Keywords—Medical IoT, Pacemaker, Penetration Testing, 
NHS, Hacking 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Implanted Medical devices have been steadily on the rise 
since the conception of medical technology, however in turn 
so has the dependency on such devices by patients. 
Pacemakers [4], insulin pumps and even neural implants are 
commonplace in everyday life. Many of these devices, and 
other types of medical equipment, have been proven time 
and again to have had flaws in their security. With little sign 
of meaningful changes to correct this concerning issue, it has 
become a hot topic in the news and in media.  
In recent years there has been an increasing amount of 
attention towards medical device hacking [11], though no 
meaningful changes have been made to existing laws and 
legislation. The issue is a disconnect between the medical 
manufacturing industry and the field of Cyber Security, at 
first glance you could almost assume that these devices are 
being developed with only basic security principles in mind.  
Cyber Security vulnerabilities have the potential to exist 
in any computer, it is easily forgotten that everything ranging 
from our smart phones to an MRI scanner are basically 
computers. If a malicious attack is performed on a server it 
can bring down a website, on a pacemaker this has the 
potential to kill. Take into account that the FDA (US Food 
and Drug Administration) recently recalled half a million 
pacemakers, due to a security vulnerability within the 
devices that could have been fatal [5].  
Interesting to note is that when a patient dies their device 
is not checked for any form of tampering, a coroner will 
check the device for a malfunction but only on the rare 
occasion that this is requested. Simply put, it could be 
possible to get away with murder if you attack the targets 
medical implant. Dick Cheney (former Vice President) had 
his pacemakers wireless functions disabled by his doctors 
over fears of hacking [8], clearly proving that medical 
practitioners know there could be a potential risk of this 
occurrence. 
This research scopes the threat landscape specifically 
within pacemaker units. It attempts to answer the question of 
if it is feasible for a person with no prior knowledge of the 
technology to hack a pacemaker. 
A. Background Information 
When people discuss medical implants, the first thing 
that comes to mind are pacemakers. This is mostly likely 
because they help to regulate the functions of the most vital 
organ within the human anatomy, coupled with the fact they 
are so commonly fitted that they are now even used as 
preventative medicine. There are an estimated 25,000 people 
every year in the UK that have a pacemaker fitted [1], this 
does not even include those outside of the UK or those who 
have other medical implants fitted. This figure is set to rise 
further with the ease of access to advanced medicine in the 
UK, as well as the longer lives that humans are experiencing 
due to the advances in modern medicine.  
Various governing bodies have discussed the idea that the 
internet should be a human right, providing all of humanity 
with information and tools that can be as helpful as they are 
dangerous. It has been proven on numerous occasions that a 
whole range of medical equipment can be hijacked by a third 
party, ranging from Insulin Pumps [16] to X-Ray systems, 
CT Scanners and even Blood Refrigeration Units [15]. Yet 
despite this knowledge, there has been little advancement 
towards even the regulation of security within such devices, 
thus attacks that were used in 2008 may still be viable in 
2018. There are governing bodies who regulate the 
manufacturers of medical devices, however, there appears to 
be an oversight when it comes to the regulations to enforce 
adequate security. 
B. User Concerns 
Data protection is a serious concern, everything from 
financial data to personal information is considered to be 
private and therefore should be protected.  
This growing concern can be attributed to the ease of 
access to information on the internet, as well as the increase 
in Internet of Things (IoT) devices; which also incorporates 
medical devices. Data is becoming more complex to increase 
functionality and usefulness, this increase in data flooding 
the airwaves has led to the ease of access a third party has to 
private information. In previous penetration tests on 
pacemakers it has been proven that data can be leaked, code 
can be injected or even replayed back to the device, 
potentially causing a fatal cardiac arrest.  
Only last year NHS systems were breached [10]. The 
attack was ransomware aimed at extorting money from the 
organisation, the question posed here however is how secure 
would patient data have been if the attack was directly aimed 
at stealing data? 
C. Summary 
Connecting devices to the internet has changed the way 
medicine works, now a patient can be monitored from home 
leading us into the realms of pre-emptive medicine. However 
like any other wireless capable device, if it can be accessed 
remotely then there will always be an unauthorised third 
party who will try it.  
It is far too easy to give a device wireless capabilities, 
this used to be a key selling point for devices however it is 
now so commonplace that it could be mistaken for a 
mandatory requirement. The benefits of wireless 
connectivity should be weighed against the risks, specifically 
the reasons why this device is wireless and if it actually 
makes good use of the added function. In an operating 
theatre, wireless equipment can prevent the potential for 
accidental trips or falls during surgery. However, if it can be 
proven that the equipment within can be hijacked remotely, 
then adequate security should be implanted or alternative 
technology should be looked at.  
A lack of security standards affects not only the end users 
but the companies as well. If a device can be hijacked and 
the data stolen, or the functions affected, then it can cause 
irreparable damage. The General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is now in effect and can fine companies who have 
their security breached, this may finally force companies 
who have previously been slack in their response to finally 
realise the importance of cybersecurity [3]. 
II. CONSIDERATIONS 
To ensure that the findings would be delivered to the 
right parties, this work has been a collaborative effort 
between the researcher and the NHS trust. 
A. Legal Considerations 
The UK Data Protection Act and both the UK and 
American Human Rights Acts guarantee the right to privacy, 
specifically article 17 of the EU Data Protection Directive 
states that the companies must protect personal data against 
any unlawful or accidental loss, alteration or destruction and 
in particular during data transmission over a network [2]. In 
security terms, the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of the data must be maintained.  
For data protection purposes, the frequency of the device 
being tested in the figures provided in this paper has not 
stated in this work. This is because it was unknown at the 
time if this can lead back to a specific manufacturer, and 
since all manufacturers donated devices anonymously this 
cannot be disclosed. 
B. Ethical Considerations 
Research that could directly or indirectly cause harm 
should be classified in proportion to the potential damage, 
with respect to this paper the work performed only details 
attack methodology and what could feasibly be found by the 
general public. Furthermore this paper will not include any 
specifics that could cause harm, as that is not the intent of 
this research and has no impact on the direct findings. The 
instructions for the attacks performed have been excluded 
from this paper, only general details from the research has 
been disclosed. 
III. ATTACK VECTORS 
When performing penetration tests on systems and 
networks it is important to scope out the incorporated 
technologies; this includes the hardware used, the software 
installed, any services that are running and how the data is 
transmitted.  
All medical implants are required to operate on the MICS 
band [7], therefore it can be determined that the devices used 
in this experiment are guaranteed to operate on the 402MHz 
to 405MHz frequency range. There have been many 
successful hacking attempts on pacemakers by hijacking the 
RF module, thus the RF modules within the devices were 
deemed the most feasible attack vector for this research. 
Feasibly it is the most likely attack vector for an attacker as it 
is easily obtainable and cheap to purchase, the antenna used 
in this experiment cost ten GBP.  
This section discusses the type of attacks that can be 
performed on medical implants, this section is a prerequisite 
to the experimentation. 
A. Denial of Service (DoS) 
DoS is a type of cyber-attack, the intended aim of which 
is to take the targeted source offline [17]. The methodology 
behind this attack is to overload the target by overpowering 
its resources, this is achieved by sending a multitude of spam 
data signals at the same time. This attack cannot work if the 
intended target has enough resources available to cope with 
the extra workload, in these instances more devices are 
required to perform the attack and succeed. DoS attacks can 
be combined with a code injection attack, the idea behind 
this is to execute spam code whilst flooding the connection 
to intensify the effect.  
The primary defence methods for this type of attack are 
as follows:  
• Disabling the wireless functions of the target to stop 
all communications 
• Increase the resources available to the target so it can 
cope with the extra load 
• Limit communication to only specific pre-authorised 
devices 
In RF terms, the equivalent of a DoS attack is signal 
jamming. This is achieved by broadcasting on the same 
frequency but at a higher power than the target, effectively 
this is spamming the airwaves in the same way that a DoS 
attack spams wireless communications. This results is the 
device being unable to cope with the high levels of 
interference and in theory, may cause erratic behaviour in the 
unit such as performing at a slower rate or even powering off 
entirely [18]. 
There are few ways to protect an RF device against signal 
jamming, the most efficient way is to attempt to mask the 
transmission so the attacker does not know which frequency 
to jam. Code Division Multiplexing (CDM) is an alternative 
method of combating signal jamming in UHF systems [19]. 
CDM works by spreading the spectrum of the signal into 
multiple channels, then each channel is encoded with its own 
unique code. Only the receiver of the signal knows the code 
generated, though the spreading effect does reduce the 
overall power of each channel.  
In theory, a pacemaker or ICD should only be accessible 
by the corresponding manufactures programmer, however, as 
can be seen in the previous examples of attacks it has been 
possible to bypass the need for these devices. Fundamentally 
this is an unavoidable failing with all communication 
technologies. If you are going to allow wireless connectivity 
then you must account for unauthorised access attempts, so 
plan accordingly. 
B. Replay Attacks 
Home monitoring units send data to and from 
pacemakers and ICDs when the user is in the vicinity. This 
data can be captured mid-traffic by utilising the listening 
functions of a radio antenna, and then it can be replayed back 
to the device. Since the data or commands it is being sent 
came from the device originally it may be able to read them, 
whether the unit accepts this signal is down to the security 
employed by the receiver.  
Since medical implants are commonplace in the UK it is 
expected that the MICS range could be flooded with signals. 
These signals clearly do not affect each other however as 
otherwise they would be subjected to constant replay attacks. 
Therefore, it can be surmised that some form of unique 
identifier must be used. If this is the case, then to 
successfully perform this attack a signal from the same 
device must be played back to it. If this is not the case then, 
theoretically any signal from a device of the same type and 
manufacturer could be used to attack any other. 
C. Code Injection 
Code injection is a generic term that refers to the 
unauthorised uploading of potentially malicious code [20]. 
The programming language used can alter however the 
fundamental techniques remain the same. When malicious 
code is packaged it is referred to as malware, this is a catch-
all term given to computer viruses.  
There are various cyber-security platforms and automated 
software that is specially designed to remove malware, 
however, if this code is not detected by such tools then it is 
left to the user to go through the system until it is found. 
Anti-virus providers and cyber-security agencies typically 
have in-house experts who specialise in searching for 
malicious code, once found their clients are notified and a 
patch to resolve the issue is pushed out. There are many 
skilled individuals who design malware to perform all sorts 
of functions such as stealing information, hijacking a device, 
blackmail purposes or just because they enjoy doing it. Due 
to the increase in IoT devices and expertise in computer 
skills, the amount of malware in circulation will 
exponentially increase.  
Pacemakers and ICDs are re-programmable, they have to 
be to ensure that any issues with the software can be patched. 
This opens up a possible avenue for attack, if code is 
accepted from any source then malicious malware could be 
uploaded to the device instead. Code does not need to be 
long and complex, if simple commands are accepted then it 
would be possible to upload a command to download the 
data, wipe the device entirely or even switch the device off. 
IV. EXPERIMENTATION 
The materials used in the tests were ex vivo devices and 
sourced from deceased patients, all devices were 
decontaminated and wiped of confidential data before being 
transferred. Full approval was sourced from the companies 
that held the patent to the corresponding device(s) prior to 
testing. Four different ex vivo devices were sourced and used 
in the research and all four devices have been anonymised of 
their manufactures by being sealed into plastic biohazard 
tubs, labelled as devices one to four. All necessary 
precautions and actions have been taken in accordance with 
the agreement between all parties involved.  
The MICS band frequency is typically flooded with 
signals, especially when in a busy location such as a 
University. Therefore to ensure the safety of those within the 
vicinity, suitable RF shielding was chosen and tested for 
signal leakage prior to performing the experiment. The most 
suitable commercially available product was the Titan RF 
shielding, which was then used to line a cardboard box. The 
antenna used in the testing was placed in the box alongside a 
testing device, the only signal that could be seen was from 
the testing device.  
A. Equiptment and Setup 
When implanted, a pacemaker or ICD unit sits under the 
collarbone, there is a short distance between an implant and 
the outside air. This may not sound like much however this 
can be enough to reduce signal strength, or shield it entirely. 
Therefore, manufacturers must take free space path loss into 
account when designing their devices. It was important to 
take this into consideration for the research. The units used 
were sealed in a thick plastic container with a three inch air 
gap, this may not quite simulate the same level of 
interference as dense bone and flesh but it will cause some 
level of interference. 
The software used in this research is all open source, this 
means it is free to obtain and has a large online user basis 
that can assist you. Each piece of software was chosen for a 
specific function, also they are all commonly used in RF 
hijacking. 
 
Hardware: 
• Linux operating system installed on a standard 
desktop computer 
• Software Defined Radio (SDR) antennae and USB 
dongle 
• Four anonymised Pacemaker/ICD implants in sealed 
biohazard tubs 
• “Yard Stick One”: Wireless transceiver 
  
Software: 
• GQRX: open source SDR receiver 
• Audacity: open source, cross-platform audio editor 
and analyser 
• RFCAT: RF transceiver software, capable of 
spectrum analysis 
 
B. Analyising the Signal 
GQRX was loaded and the SDR antenna was selected as 
the method of transmission. In fig. 1 GQRX is used to view 
the MICS range, this is 402MHz to 405MHz, as all medical 
implants run on this range.  
The MICS band range is heavily populated, the research 
was performed in a densely populated urban area thus this 
makes sense. The devices in the range had a nice even 
spacing, this most likely was intentional as to prevent any 
signal issues caused by an overlap.  
Note that during the experiment the signal was recorded, 
this was to be loaded into audacity to both analyse the signals 
further and to be used in the replay attack. 
 
Fig. 1. SDR antenna recording a signal through GQRX 
As can be seen in fig. 1 the wavelength was quite 
uniform, this is because this signal that was captured was the 
carrier signal. The units also appear to have multiple 
sidebands, though some of these may be false signals caused 
by interference from a cheap antenna, either way this leads to 
the conclusion that the devices employ Phase Shift Keying 
(PSK). This is further backed up as clear phase reversal 
patterns can be seen in fig. 3, the phase of the wave is 
shifting from the carrier to reflect binary values [21]. 
The carrier signal is used as a timing mechanism for the 
keying, when data is sent the waveform changes. The signal 
modulates to send data, the modulation can send multiple 
values, more than just a single 0 or 1. To simplify, there are 
many forms of PSK, these can even be combined with 
amplitude modulation to create new forms. These forms will 
not be discussed in this paper, as they are not conducive to 
the end results nor required for understanding the figures 
shown.  
 
Fig. 2. Wavelength of a captured signal (programmer) 
 
Fig. 3. Wavelength with modulation mapped 
It could be possible to decode the signal by working out 
the value of the sifting phase, however, this proved to be 
difficult and the attempt was abandoned in favour of a 
conventional security analysis. This could lead to the 
conclusion that it is not feasible for an amateur to decode the 
signal. 
Based on the reconnaissance results it can surmised that a 
hacker would need access to a hospital, or at least a home 
monitoring unit, to capture meaningful data to be used when 
hacking a pacemaker or ICD. 
C. Radio Frequency Attacks 
Once reconnaissance on the devices was performed, the 
threat landscape was mapped and attacks performed in the 
shielded testing environment. 
1) Signal Jamming 
Signal jamming was performed by setting the Yard Stick 
One to the same frequency as the device being tested, then 
the power of the signal was set to the maximum that the 
antenna could provide. 
Devices 1 to 4 all succumbed to signal jamming, this 
came as expected. Though it is worth noting that no signs of 
erratic behaviour were present, only the communication 
module was affected. That is to say that communication to 
and from the device was blocked, the carrier signal remains 
visible however becomes distorted and unusable. If this was 
performed during an update of a device it may corrupt the 
data entirely, possibly affecting the defibrillation function, 
though this is a very specific scenario and would be 
detectable. 
The most likely reason for this attack not affecting the 
device would be due to Bandpass filtering, which is 
employed in modern implants and so would have protected 
against a lower power signal jamming attempt; a higher 
power attack however is harder to defend against though 
would not be feasible to perform without more expensive 
equipment. 
2) Code Injection 
In a previous attack in 2008 it was possible to replace the 
patient’s name in the device, if this is possible then it is also 
possible to upload any code to a device. The Yard Stick One 
was set to attempt to upload the word “Hello” to see if the 
test devices would accept code. Once uploaded the Yard 
Stick One awaiting a returning signal, similar in concept to 
the TCP handshake, a response was received though the 
results implied that all four devices had not accepted the 
code. 
From this it can be determined that the devices use a 
form of checksum, most likely it employs Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) as it is a commonly used in the 
transmission of data packets [6]. To decode this, someone 
would need to look through possibly thousands of packets as 
to work out the pattern in the CRC. The checksum would 
prevent code from being injected, as the malicious packets 
would not be sequential to those in the pacemaker, thus the 
device would ignore the incoming data.  
Depending on the encryption methods used it may be 
possible to reverse engineer these packets, if this is done then 
data can be uploaded and the security in place bypassed. It is 
unlikely that this could be done using commercially available 
equipment, or at least not without expert knowledge on the 
matter. 
3) Replay Attack 
A data packet from a pacemaker could potentially be 
accepted by another, as the packet would be formatted for 
use with the internal equipment and method of data transfer. 
If a signal that induces defibrillation could be captured then 
it could be replayed back to any implant. 
This test was performed by using GQRX to capture a 
signal, and then using the Yard Stick One it was possible to 
replay this signal directly at a device. Devices 1 to 4 all 
rejected the replayed signal, the reason is most likely the 
combination of why the devices rejected the code injection 
and why there was no erratic behaviour during the signal 
jamming.  
The rejection of the code was expected, though not for 
the same reasons as the other attacks. The code used was 
quite basic, furthermore it took longer than it would have 
done with an actual implanted device to collect data relevant 
enough for this attack to be performed. 
Simply put, it is easier to perform this attack in the real 
world. For this attack to be reattempted a live setup must be 
used, to do this patient consent must be signed which can 
take time. This attack vector could be revisited in future 
research at a higher level. 
D. Summary 
Radio Frequency has been previously stated as being 
easily breakable, however, the results from this line of testing 
could argue that they are shielded enough to alleviate users 
concerns. It could be a legal consideration as to why 
documentation states potential risks of EMI interference, that 
device manufacturers who implement RF technology must 
inform the user of potential risk. 
The devices used in the tests were provided by the NHS, 
they are standard modern units and as such it is expected that 
they should have a reasonable defence against hacking. To 
answer the question posed in this paper, it may be feasible 
for someone to scope out the landscape and attempt the 
attacks. However for the attacks to work, the individual must 
have expertise and knowledge of both RF and the inner 
workings of the devices. Attempts using more high-tech 
equipment could potentially reveal weakness, though that is 
something to return to in future research. 
To answer all the questions posed in this paper it would 
require access to a working setup, this setup would require a 
live pacemaker or ICD connected to a home monitoring unit. 
V. SIDE EXPERIMENTS 
This section briefly explains other tests that were 
performed, which use alternative methods and equipment 
from the main body of the work. When discovering 
vulnerabilities it is important to test multiple methods, these 
tests were performed to see if these were other areas worth 
exploring 
A. RFID Scanner 
An attempt was made to scan the devices using a 
standard RFID scanner used in cloning cards, a report in 
2010 [9] stated some RFID scanners can interfere in 
pacemakers, therefore this test was to see if implants could 
be vulnerable in 2018. In theory if this was possible then the 
code could be uploaded to the device and some operational 
functions could be accessible, the device could be turned off 
for example.  
It is fortunate that this is not the case as this method is 
very simple to attempt. It is worth noting however that there 
are many other more powerful RFID readers out there which 
may, with the right programming, possibly be able to do this. 
B. Oscilloscope 
A setup involving an oscilloscope was attempted. This 
was an attempt to mimic a setup used in a 2008 test 
performed on magnetic induction based devices [14]. Due to 
the primary aim of this work it was deemed unnecessary to 
further this specific method of testing.  
This was mostly due to that an oscilloscope setup 
requires the implant to be directly connected to the unit. The 
devices used in this test were sealed in a container for 
anonymity, so this test was not possible on any of the devices 
(aside from a standalone test implant that was obtained and 
excluded from the primary experimentation). 
Feasibly the RF antenna used in this research would be 
the most likely tool used to exploit these devices as it is 
cheaper, easier to obtain and gave the same results as the 
oscilloscope. There is also far more information on hacking 
RF technology than there is in decoding signals using an 
oscilloscope, overall the RF antenna provides a more 
accurate answer to the question posed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The results from the experimentation were promising, the 
fact they were not vulnerable to basic attacks shows a 
commitment to security from the manufacturer’s involved. 
Do not let this make you complaisant and ignore the broader 
issues however, the legal aspects and manufacturing 
regulations are still lacking across the industry. Furthermore 
these experiments were performed on current NHS models 
that have been put through rigorous testing, devices from 
other companies or countries may not be as secure as those 
involved in this test. 
Consider that in some cases patients have pacemakers or 
ICDs fitted pre-emptively, even if they are not active at the 
time if the device is vulnerable it could still trigger 
fibrillation. It is not only those who rely on the units that are 
at risk, those who have them fitted and do not rely on them 
have equal risk. 
Also consider that there is still potential to cause a fatal 
heart attack in some devices almost 10 years after the flaws 
were reported [13], this can only lead to the conclusion that 
meaningful research and the development of new security 
methods is vital. In an ideal scenario independent security 
officers should have the ability to test the devices for such 
flaws as is the case in some other industries, new laws are 
clearly required to prevent this in the future. The industry is 
catching up to the necessary standards however progress has 
been far too slow. 
Barnaby Jack [12], the most renowned medical hacker, 
was quoted stating that hacking into a pacemaker was easy. It 
is important to remember however that quote was from an 
expert in the field, there is reasonable difficulty in 
performing this feat without access to high-grade equipment 
and expertise. 
Home monitoring units should be considered as vital 
pieces of equipment. The idea that a patient could have their 
condition monitored constantly is life-changing, potentially 
reducing the drain on healthcare resources and improving the 
general health of patients across the globe. The units also 
contain private and personal information, on both the patient 
and their implanted device, these devices have been proven 
to be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle exploits yet this is 
overshadowed in the media. 
Pacemakers and ICDs clearly have the potential to be 
vulnerable in the same way as any other device, the issue 
here is the same one that is affecting the security of all IoT 
devices. The problem is that people only think of desktops, 
laptops and some mobile devices when they think of 
computers. In the age of IoT, every device can have a 
computer embedded within it. Therefore all devices comes 
with the same risks of potential vulnerabilities in the 
software, hardware or general function that could be 
exploited. 
Bluetooth is due to become the next standard of wireless 
communication modules for medical implants, if the lapse in 
cybersecurity knowledge in the medical industry carries over 
then users may be just as vulnerable, if not more. Bluetooth 
technology is commonplace and has had some serious 
vulnerability over the years, there are even tutorials online 
that demonstrate how to exploit these issues. 
RF has many faults as well, though if Bluetooth turns out 
to be more vulnerable then RF may be more viable, at least 
for the time being. Protective methods such as BPF may 
exist in RF however that does not mean it is enforced. If BPF 
is standard practice then the possible effects of EMI on 
implants may be exaggerated, though if this is not the case 
then EMI may be more harmful than users realise. 
Old laws and legislations are commonly applied to new 
technologies and practices, it does not mean that they work 
however. This is commonly the case for copyright law, the 
law does not adequately cater for the IoT age yet it shows 
little sign of being revised. The CVD for example has been 
standardised yet it is not an enforced standard practice, yet 
some companies have adopted the principle of it. This clearly 
shows that the market is ready to accept such ideas, as they 
can benefit everyone involved.  
The issue here could be resolved by a threat to enforce 
these legislations with a set deadline, the industry would then 
have to sit up and take notice or face the possibility of legal 
reprisal if they fail to comply. GDPR may be the turning 
point that enforces security across all industries, the only 
problem here would be if the companies then only 
implement the bare minimum security required, treating this 
recent law an annoyance rather than enforcement. 
Fundamentally, the main issue cyber security faces across 
all industries is that it has no financial return. It can be 
argued that by increasing security, you are reducing the risk 
of financial loss from lawsuits. However, the bottom line is 
that no money is directly made from it, but rather money is 
spent to prevent a greater loss. This kind of thinking is 
implemented by companies to make a profit, which is 
understandable as people are not paid to think outside of 
their own area. They should instead see such a cost as an 
insurance policy, a way of minimising damage with a 
financial safety net. Therefore in the same way that one 
would take an insurance policy out before they can drive a 
vehicle, these manufacturers should have to ensure a 
minimum level of security within their own devices before 
they can be used. 
This work attempted to answer if someone with no prior 
knowledge of the technology could attack it, just because it 
appears that the devices are safe against amateurs does not 
mean they are safe against expert hackers. The security of 
medical devices must be investigated now in its infancy, 
before this becomes the next form of cyber terrorism. With 
the increase in availability of information, and the rise in the 
numbers of malicious hackers, the security of medical 
devices as a whole should be paramount. 
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